The Truth Behind Russian VS Tank Difference At the Start of The War

[Wenin 2,654]

...

So, the americans which forgot to oil the Oil filter and germans which couldn't drive a T-34 and didn't had spare parts and tools for it (there is also an translation error, the original speaks about a recommended speed, not a maximum achievable speed)? And?
 

"Comments on the evaluation of T-34 and KV tanks by workers of the Aberdeen proving grounds in the USA, representatives of companies, officers, and commission members.

I. Tank condition

According to information received from the Americans, the T-34, after traveling 343 km, was disabled by the breakdown of the V-2 diesel engine. The Americans are of the opinion that this was caused by a poor air filter on the diesel engine.

The T-34 sent to America had an air filter of the "Pomon" type. This filter was installed on T-34 and BT tanks. If properly cleaned and supplied with oil (in exceptionally dusty environments, this must be done once every 2-3 hours), the Pomon filter guarantees normal engine operation with 79.6% air purity at air dustiness of 1 gram per cubic meter. The filter at Aberdeen was not cleaned [Note: the filter was also not oiled. The Americans wonder why the filter is called "oily" by the Soviets in their impressions], which led to uncharacteristic engine wear."

Edited August 19, 2014 by Wenin

[Shanzival 210]

the good old idiotic argument of " germany lost therefor their tanks were worse " great to see such flawless logic and highly intelligent arguments on the soviet side of this discussion allways a joy discussing with such geniuses ...

 

Sorry, I thought if I'd carry out a conversation on the same level as the "LA LA LA I CAN'T HEAR YOU" posters who fanatically defend German tanks then maybe it would get through. But I guess I overestimated things.

 

T-34 failure rates were high early on because of a handful of reasons, including crew unfamiliarity with their vehicles. Unlike American tankers, the Soviet tankers didn't have nearly as much familiarity with mechanical vehicles nor were they properly instructed about the care and maintenance of the vehicle. It's like trying to claim that the M16 platform is a terrible weapon because of how it performed when first fielded in Vietnam.

[Abgeschossene 10,084]

T-34 failure rates were high early on because of a handful of reasons, including crew unfamiliarity with their vehicles. Unlike American tankers, the Soviet tankers didn't have nearly as much familiarity with mechanical vehicles nor were they properly instructed about the care and maintenance of the vehicle. It's like trying to claim that the M16 platform is a terrible weapon because of how it performed when first fielded in Vietnam.

 

Farmers were good drivers for the T-34s weren't they? (They picked them due to the transmission)

[App4that@psn 1,988]

Sorry, I thought if I'd carry out a conversation on the same level as the "LA LA LA I CAN'T HEAR YOU" posters who fanatically defend German tanks then maybe it would get through. But I guess I overestimated things.

 

T-34 failure rates were high early on because of a handful of reasons, including crew unfamiliarity with their vehicles. Unlike American tankers, the Soviet tankers didn't have nearly as much familiarity with mechanical vehicles nor were they properly instructed about the care and maintenance of the vehicle. It's like trying to claim that the M16 platform is a terrible weapon because of how it performed when first fielded in Vietnam.

Honest question here. If the measure of a good tank is in the details not it's use, then manufacturing problems associated with laborers should also be removed. A majority of the problems with the Tiger and other late war German Tanks had to do with who was building them, not the design. I would advocate that design should play a larger roll than historical accuracy with variables that do little to add to gameplay.

[Kawinksy 229]

.

Edited September 4, 2014 by Zuegmeister

[Wenin 2,654]

It is known, that before the war, the Russians aero engine industry was mainly engaged in producing engines of foreign design, notably Wright, Bristol, Hispano-Suiza and Gnome-Rhone. Several engines of so-called original design have been developed although these were probably largely based on foreign models. One of these, the M.34, was shown at the 1936 Paris Aero show. The reduction gear and supercharger are naturally missing on the tank engine, but the cylinder blocks, heads (allowing for conversion to C.I.) the general grouping of auxiliaries and the engine bearers appear to be virtually (may differ in the internal design) the same. The M.34 have been originally designed in Italy (Fiat) for the Russians and follows closely internally designs of Italian in-line Aero engine practice.

You mean the AM-34? Which was an design by Mikulin and has nothing to do with Italy? And has nothing to do with the V-2?

Edited August 19, 2014 by Wenin

[Kawinksy 229]

.

Edited September 4, 2014 by Zuegmeister

[Wenin 2,654]

No, I speak about C.I tank engine Type V-2 from T-34 cruiser tank.

 

The desgin of the V12 clyinder engine generally follows orthodox aero engine practice. It is very light, the cylinder heads, crankpase and sump being light alloy castings.

Sure, it was based on the AD-1 from Kharkov design bureau from 1931, which was first designated as aero engine and then as BD-2 for use in tanks.

[Kawinksy 229]

.

Edited September 4, 2014 by Zuegmeister

[Wenin 2,654]

You might change your direction when reading some foreign in-line design practice, especially on Fiat.

 

Originally the V-2-34 was designed by Italians.

I'm pretty sure Chelpan is no italian.

[Kawinksy 229]

.

Edited September 4, 2014 by Zuegmeister

[Wenin 2,654]

I'm sorry, I can't do much with only the cover sheet.

[Kawinksy 229]

.

Edited September 4, 2014 by Zuegmeister

[Waldkriecher 1,534]

So, the americans which forgot to oil the Oil filter and germans which couldn't drive a T-34 and didn't had spare parts and tools for it (there is also an translation error, the original speaks about a recommended speed, not a maximum achievable speed)? And?
 

"Comments on the evaluation of T-34 and KV tanks by workers of the Aberdeen proving grounds in the USA, representatives of companies, officers, and commission members.

I. Tank condition

According to information received from the Americans, the T-34, after traveling 343 km, was disabled by the breakdown of the V-2 diesel engine. The Americans are of the opinion that this was caused by a poor air filter on the diesel engine.

The T-34 sent to America had an air filter of the "Pomon" type. This filter was installed on T-34 and BT tanks. If properly cleaned and supplied with oil (in exceptionally dusty environments, this must be done once every 2-3 hours), the Pomon filter guarantees normal engine operation with 79.6% air purity at air dustiness of 1 gram per cubic meter. The filter at Aberdeen was not cleaned [Note: the filter was also not oiled. The Americans wonder why the filter is called "oily" by the Soviets in their impressions], which led to uncharacteristic engine wear."

 

Link please.

 

Also good job on ignoring all the other aspects again.

 

 

I am stil waiting for your sources on Panther variants btw.

[Cruella_Mortemo 4,710]

You never stop do you? Such a biased person, you NEVER post ANYTHING in favor of axis tanks. And a lot of "facts" pulled right out of your behind.

 

Can I get a source for the 2000h average for the T34? Were those 2000 hours on train carts?

Can I have a detailed source about "most" Panther breaking down before getting to the battlefield? And I am talking about ALL variants.

 

But keep spewing your nonsense about stronk reliable sovjet tanks. They had a lot of issues as well depending on model and variant.

 

Btw. can we nerf the KV2 to complete useless as it was in RL? Can we nerf the reverse speeds of IS tanks too? Can we remove post war ammo as well? I never see you posting that.........I wonder why comrade.

 

PS; You and people like you are responsible for the state WT is now, blind Sovjet fanboism with a hint of behindkissing to GJ.

 

[Radom 4,245]

Here are some snipets from historical accouts about reliability and transmission issue that pre 1943 limited speed in most cases to 25 km/h:

 

Reliability

 

Interesting information on the T-34’s reliability (or lack thereof) during the Kamenets-Podolsky operation (Hube’s Pocket) of March-April 1944 is available from ‘Tank Rider: Into the Reich with the Red Army’

 

From page 64

‘We were happy when tanks from our Brigade’s tank regiment caught up with our battalion and we moved on as tank riders. We had just one objective — to capture Kamenets-Podolsk. Running a bit ahead, I would say that it took the Brigade two or three days to arrive at the town. Both people and tanks were tired; the vehicles couldn’t take such stress either. Tanks stopped more and more often because of small technical breakdowns, especially broken tracks. Of course we tank riders assisted in tank repairs, so as not to fall behind the battalion.’

 

From page 77

‘We did not have many tanks left, and even those that remained had already used up their engine lifetime and were constantly breaking down. The tank that I was on with my soldiers also broke down. After a day-long stop in a village (we were already in the Western Ukraine), our tank stopped and would not move on. The battalion commander ordered us to stay with the tank and wait for it to be repaired. A day passed by and in the morning the tank crew told us that the breakdown was serious and we were stuck for a long time. I decided not to wait for the completion of the repairs, but to catch up with the battalion on foot.’

 

From page 79

‘After a brief rest the battalion received an order to advance and set up defences on the bank of Strypa river in the village of Dobropolie. Further to the west was the town of Bulach, where German reinforcements were starting to arrive. The Brigade was not capable of executing offensive operations. Its personnel was almost gone, almost all equipment was out of action. Out of 450 to 500 tanks of the 4th Tank Army at the beginning of the operation, the entire army only had around 60 vehicles, all with some kind of breakdown.’

 

The 5-speed gearbox controversy

Initially the T-34 had a 4-speed gearbox. The 4th gear could be used only on a paved road, thus the max cross-country speed was theoretically 25 km/h but in practice it was only 15km/h because changing from 2^nd gear to 3^rd required superhuman strength.

On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox which allowed for a cross country speed of 30 km/h. This equipment supposedly became standard from 1943 onwards.

 

However it seems that the T-34/85 tanks that were given to the Polish forces in late 1944/early 1945 still had the 4-speed gearbox. ‘T-34: Mythical Weapon’ byMichulec and Zientarzewski says in page 349:

‘It was accepted, due to the available information in the subject literature, that the switch to the 5-speed transmission took place in 1943. However, the documents regarding the T- 34-85s delivered during the period end 1944/beginning 1945 (a month after their production) to the Polish forces prove that practically all vehicles had the 4-speed transmission. This applied to tanks produced by the No.183 Factory as much as to the ones produced by the No.112 Factory. The works on the new 5-speed gearbox along with the new main clutch design started in July – August of 1942 and paralleled the development of the T-34S.

[posuidexiaoming 546]

What drives me nuts is when firing the German 88 or Panther 75/L70 gun at 1,000 meters plus range the second shot you fire at an aim point hits way off from were the fist shot hits, even when you don't change that aim point. Same with the 75/L42 and 48...

 

I realize there might be a SLIGHT difference in ammo quality but having a almost constant 200 meter plus or minus spread between hits aimed at the same point at long range is just nuts. German optics and ammo was better than that. Same for the Soviet guns... the shot spread for the same aim point is a bit much.

 

Just my two cents worth...

Edited August 19, 2014 by _Klank_

[_waldbiene_ 14,632]

 

Mobility

 

The KV-1/KV-2 models of 1940–41 had very poor mobility due to inadequate

transmissions and horsepower-weight, which greatly reduced their impact on the

battlefield. Faulty clutches also made some KV tanks virtually unsteerable, which even

occurred in front of Stalin during the parade in Moscow on November 7, 1941. KV

transmissions tended to fail after as little as 800km (500mi) of road marching. Unlike

the T-34 tank, which had its mobility well tested by Koshkin during road trials in

1940, the KV entered service after negligible testing and operators soon found out that

it could move only short distances without breaking down. In combat, KVs typically

advanced at speeds of only 3–4km/h (2–2.5mph), which made them large, slowmoving

targets. Their top off-road speed was 16km/h (10mph) and their turning

radius was poor. The KV did very poorly on marshy or soft ground, with many lost

simply because they became stuck in the mud – no way for a superior weapon to

perish. Simply put, the early KV models did not have adequate mobility to conduct

their breakthrough role successfully. Retreats were also very hard on KVs, with many

being lost or abandoned because of a plethora of mobility issues (such as difficulty in

crossing bridges or handling hilly terrain). Eventually, the introduction of the KV-1S

model in 1942 and further refinements gradually improved the KV’s mobility to the

point where it could accomplish its breakthrough mission, although by then improved

German Panzerjäger capabilities made that increasingly problematic.

 

---

 

Kapitan Zinoviev K. Slyusarenko, commander of the 1st Battalion/19th Tank Regiment, noted that:

“The enemy shells could not penetrate our armor, but damaged treads, knocked off turrets.

KV tanks were powerful vehicles, but sorely lacking in speed and maneuverability.”

 

---

 

The KV-1 was a giant with feet of clay. Kotin’s mismanagement of the heavy tank

program in Leningrad in 1937–39 wasted too many resources on creating alternate

designs, rather than focusing on perfecting a single design. Compared to Koshkin’s

management of the T-34 medium tank program, Kotin’s effort resulted in a heavy tank

that fell far short of the Red Army’s expectations. Instead of building the best heavy

tank his team could design, Kotin simply piled ore armor plate onto an already overloaded

chassis but failed to ensure that it had sufficient motive power to accomplish

its mission.

 

 

Training 

 

Altogether, the Red Army intended to train more than 5,000 KV tankers but despite

efforts to rush new recruits through training, barely 600 had gone through basic

training by June 1941. Only 17 battalions were in existence, none of which were

combat-ready. In order to protect the KVs from unnecessary wear and tear, the General

Staff had directed that driver training would be conducted on obsolete T-27 tankettes,

rather than the new KVs. Thus, by June 1941 most KV drivers had only 3–5 hours’

worth of experience, and on dissimilar machines. Junior officers often didn’t know

how to read maps and often led their platoons into ground that was too marshy for

the KV, causing many tanks to become bogged down. Battalions in the western

military districts had plenty of new recruits but were missing 25–50 percent of their

officers and NCOs.

 

Most KV tankers were draftees, but in the early stages of the war – when there was

a surge of patriotism – there were volunteers attracted to serving on heavy tanks. The

Red Army tended to select better-educated recruits, usually high-school graduates

with follow-on automotive training or experience, for service in heavy tank units.

Pre-war training was typically one year long for those on track to get commissions as

junior officers, although NCO and junior enlisted training was about half that.

Motivations among recruits varied immensely and the recent purges had an effect on

morale; KV trainee Arseni Rod’kin recalled that his uncle had been arrested in the

purges and subsequently died in prison, which affected his attitude toward the regime

he served. Rod’kin later said that: “The Kremlin xxxxxxxx come and go, but the

Motherland is forever … I was defending my country, not the Soviets.”

 

Once the German invasion began, both production of KVs and training of crews

were disrupted. When the Kirov plant relocated to Chelyabinsk in October 1941,

most KV training was also shifted there. A reserve tank training regiment was created

at Chelyabinsk to conduct training, but for much of 1942 it had only two KV tanks

and a few other types. Oftentimes, training was conducted on substitutes or even on

foot. The period of training was reduced to eight months for officers and three months

for junior NCOs. Unlike the German method, trainees were not formed into

permanent crews during training, but only when they reached their operational unit.

Most Soviet tankers recall that training was unrealistic and did little to prepare them

for combat. Gunnery training was mostly limited to sub-caliber substitutes, namely

firing a machine gun through the main gun barrel. Training against their primary

opponent – concealed enemy antitank guns – was non-existent, although there was

some discussion about engaging bunkers. Most KV commanders were unprepared for

how little visibility they would have when buttoned-up in combat and how to work

with supporting infantry, which proved quite detrimental on the battlefield. Driver

training was also minimal, which meant no practical instruction on proper use of

terrain for concealed movement. Instead, trainees were given large doses of mindless

drills, such as loading and unloading dummy rounds into the breach, as well as hours

of Communist indoctrination.

...

Throughout much of 1941–43, KVs tended to fight in platoon-size formations of 3–4 tanks.

 

 

 

source: Panzerjäger vs KV-1: Eastern Front 1941-43 (Duel)

 

 

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES Russian Tanks of World War II p 117

 

When it first appeared. the KV- l 's combination of mobiliry. strong armour and firepower made it one of the most powerful tanks in the world. probably only rivalled or surpassed by the Soviet medium T-34. Its frontal hull and turret armour were 75mm (2.95in) and 90mm (3.5in) thick respectively, making it
invulnerable to many existing antitank guns, other than at point blank range. Although weighing 43.6 ronnes (43 tons). a series of factors meant that it was relatively fast and mobile. capable of achieving 35km/ h (2 1.8mph) on roads. and approximately 13km/ h (8.1 mph) across country. This was achieved by a refined version of the SMK suspension which mounted the 12 wheels independently on torsion bars, and using wide tracks to lower ground pressure.

 

Adequate power was provided by a 373kW (SOObhp) model V-2K, V-12 diesel engine. Combined with a range of 160km (99 miles) by road, and 100km (62 miles) across country, the KV-1, in conjunction with the even more mobile T-34, seemed to give the Red Army the tools it required to implement the theory
of Deep Operations. Initially it was intended to arm the KV-1 with the F-32 76.2mm gun (3in)
developed by the Grabin team, but delays in supply meant that the short L- 11 76.2mm (3 in) was used instead. Secondary armament comprised three DT machine guns, one co-axial, one in the front hull, and one in the rear of the turret. A crew of five was required to operate the tank.

Impressive as it was, the KV- 1 did suffer from a number of problems, and not all had been solved by the time production ended in 1943. Initial models had major clutch and transmission problems, seriously impeding its mobility. Changing gear involved halting the tank, preventing it from ever attaining high speed. US Army tests on the transmission at their Aberdeen Armoured Testing ground in 1942 noted that it was years out of date and had been rejected by the US Army because it was painfully hard for the driver to work. Engine performance was further reduced by inefficient air filters. Overall, these factors made the
tank hard to steer. The crew compartment was far from ideal and hampered performance in combat. When the hatches were closed. The driver and commander had severely restricted vision, making it difficult for them to carry o ut their tasks effectively. The driver's periscope had a limited traverse,
and the laminated glass in his forward slit visor was often of such poor manufacture that it was difficult to see through. The commander had two periscopes of a reasonable standard mounted in the top of the turret, but his ability to direct the driver, radio operator and gunner were significantly hampered
by having to double up as gun loader. All of this resulted in poor tactical mobility and coordination on the battlefield.

During the course of the war, refinements were made to the basic KV-1 design in order to iron out its flaws and extend its service life. In 1940 the KV-1 model 1940 appeared, armed with the higher velocity F-32 76.2mm (3in) gun firing a longer round and a new, more powerful 447kW (600bhp) V-2 engine.

 

 

 

http://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/160164-the-ultimate-kv-thread/

 

Inside the KV-1

[spoiler]

http://books.google.de/books?id=jpyKy2ctf1AC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=KV-1+crew++loader&source=bl&ots=P1Eyv8Rpw1&sig=i_tzHJu4hRpEefxxTeT67Zmu9_I&hl=de&sa=X&ei=6yXFU5HsC8ak4gSa1YEg&ved=0CJgBEOgBMAs#v=onepage&q=KV-1%20crew%20%20loader&f=false

 

[/spoiler]

 

KV-2

[spoiler]

source: Russian Tanks of World War II: Stalin's Armoured Might

 

source: Stalin's Giants KV-I / KV-II SCHIFFER MILITARY BOOK

[/spoiler]

Edited August 19, 2014 by Trommelfeuer

[_waldbiene_ 14,632]

Panther

One of the unseen but important interior improvements to the Panther

Ausf. A tank turret was the replacement of the single-speed turret traverse

drive with a variable-speed turret traverse drive, which in theory would allow

the gunner to acquire targets in his sight more quickly.

 

Other unseen internal changes within the Panther Ausf. A tank turret

included redesigned seals for both the turret race and the gun shield and the

addition of simplified elevating gear for the main gun. There also were

changes to the loader’s and gunner’s seats, as well as the gunner’s foot pedals

for using the hydraulic traverse to turn the vehicle’s turret.

 

According to a report written by Guderian on March 5, 1944, the constant

improvements to the Panther tank series resulted in some positive feedback

from the user community. He wrote that one Panther tank-equipped unit on

the Eastern Front stated that they felt their tank was far superior to the Red

Army T-34 medium tanks. They went on to report that all the early

mechanical difficulties that had so bedeviled the early production units of

the Panther tank had been ironed out of the design. As proof, they offered

the fact that service life of the tank’s engine had gone up to 435 to 621 miles

(700 to 1,000 km). In addition, the same Panther tank-equipped unit

reported that final drive breakdowns had ended and that transmission and

steering gear failures were now within an acceptable range, which is damning

with faint praise.

 

 

[spoiler]

 

MUZZLE VELOCITY

 

Higher muzzle velocities offer a number of advantages to the lethality of a

tank gun. Muzzle velocity is the speed at which a projectile leaves the bore

of a gun. Because the projectile is subjected to external forces (e.g., gravity,

cross-wind), a higher velocity means a shorter amount of time in flight and

an increased probability of obtaining a hit. Higher muzzle velocity also

reduces the requirement for precise range estimation and simplifies the

gunner’s problem of lead estimation against moving targets. Higher muzzle

velocity also provides a much flatter trajectory (flight path) for projectiles.

This was revealed during post-World War II testing of Panther tanks by the

American military at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in 1946, in

which it was shown at 1,000 yards (914 m) that the 75-mm main gun on the

Panther tank could place all of its shots within a 12-inch (31-cm) circle. Tests

conducted at the same location the prior year on captured Panther tanks had

demonstrated that the fired projectiles had such a flat trajectory that the

gunner did not even have to change his elevation settings until he began

engaging enemy targets at ranges greater than 2,000 yards (1.8 km).

[/spoiler]

 

source: Panther Germany's quest for combat dominance

 

Edited August 19, 2014 by Trommelfeuer

[Nefer666 3,807]

How t-34 engine could have 2000km between repairs when it was know t-34 had terrible,  really bad air filter? Its not possible to achive such distance with bad air filter. They might achive those 2000km in perfect, laboratory conditions, but on battlefield? Keep dreamin'  There was a lot stories about t-34's engine breaking down mid assault. Even Aberdeen tests pointed t-34 airfilter-engine failure. 

Edited August 19, 2014 by Nefer666

[Spitfire_ 7,306]

Maybe the units that reported breaking down didnt clean thier airfilters while other units were squeaky clean?.

 

Because you know, variables.

[Nefer666 3,807]

Aberdeen test quotes: 

 

http://english.battlefield.ru/evaluation-of-the-t-34-and-kv-dp1.html

 

 

"The T-34 medium tank after driving 343 km, became completely disabled and that could not be fixed. The reason: owing to the extremely poor air filter system on the diesel, a large quantity of dirt got into the engine and a breakdown occurred, as a result of which the pistons and cylinders were damaged to such a degree that they were impossible to fix."

 

"The deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device. They also don't understand why in our manuals it is called oil-bath. Their tests in a laboratory showed that:

• the air cleaner doesn't clean at all the air which is drawn into the motor;

• its capacity does not allow for the flow of the necessary quantity of air, even when the motor is idling. As a result, the motor does not achieve its full capacity. Dirt getting into the cylinders leads them to quickly wear out, compression drops, and the engine loses even more power. In addition, the filter was manufactured, from a mechanical point of view, extremely primitively: in places the spot-welding of the electric welding has burned through the metal, leading to leakage of oil etc [this claim was noticed and later variants of T-34 received the new "Cyclon" filter]. On the KV the filter is better manufactured, but it does not secure the flow in sufficient quantity of normal cleaned air. On both motors the starters are poor, being weak and of unreliable construction."

[Nope 10,634]

 

Aberdeen test quotes: 

 

http://english.battlefield.ru/evaluation-of-the-t-34-and-kv-dp1.html

 

I thought they made grave mistakes with that T-34 at Aberdeen.

[xthetenth 532]

As documented earlier in literally this thread, yes they did. They wondered why the filter was described as oily. It was supposed to be oiled to function.

 

I also like Radom's discussion of how tanks running low on motor-hours had mechanical problems with no discussion of minor factors like how far they'd driven, what use they'd seen or how long it had been since an overhaul. You know, the critical factors for making a judgment about reliability numbers. It's amazing the number of huge block quotes that get posted that aren't actually discussing the matter at hand.

Edited August 20, 2014 by xthetenth

[cashdash 775]

I thought they made grave mistakes with that T-34 at Aberdeen.

 

if by grave mistakes you mean literally failed to follow basic vehicle operation standards on a tank made from about 4 different scrap hulls because the Russians weren't dumb enough to send a combat ready tank halfway around the world when it was needed at the front. then yes.